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The Shibboleth of Sovereignty 
 Martin Loughlin* and Stephen Tierney** 
 
 
Abstract. Sovereignty is the central tenet of modern British constitutional thought but its meaning 
remains misunderstood. Lawyers treat it as a precise legal concept – the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty – but commonly fail to acknowledge that that doctrine is erected on a skewed sense of 
what sovereignty entails. In particular, they do not see that the doctrine rests on a particular political 
conviction, that the British state depends on a central authority equipped with an unlimited power. 
These two facets of sovereignty are now so deeply intertwined in legal consciousness that they cannot 
easily be unravelled and this becomes the main barrier to thinking constructively about Britain’s 
constitutional arrangements. This article substantiates these claims by explaining how the doctrine 
came into being, demonstrating how it is tied to a deeper political conviction, showing that its political 
underpinnings have been considerably weakened over the last century, and indicating how its re-
working is the precondition of constitutional renewal.   
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I Introduction 
 
The legal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is such a fundamental tenet of constitutional belief 
that we commonly assume it to be of ancient provenance. In reality, it is a late-nineteenth century 
creation. Its author, the Victorian jurist Albert Venn Dicey, presented it as the central element of a 
work that sought to shift the basis of British constitutional thought. Noting that hitherto the 
constitution had been treated as a historical phenomenon, he argued that constitutional scholars, 
having been seduced by speculative ideas, had been drawn into a ‘maze in which the wanderer is 
perplexed by unreality …, by antiquarianism, and by conventionalism’.1 Criticizing those who 
regarded the constitution as an object of veneration, he maintained that the scholar’s duty must not 
be to eulogise but merely to analyse and expound.2  
Dicey argued that a scientific explanation could be advanced only by establishing a new 
and autonomous field, that of ‘the law of the constitution’. Noting that Blackstone in his influential 
Commentaries on the Laws of England of 1765 nowhere uses the term ‘constitutional law’,3 Dicey 
                                                          
* Professor of Public Law, London School of Economics & Political Science. 
** Professor of Constitutional Theory, University of Edinburgh. 
1 A.V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan 1885), 7. For subsequent 
references, we use The Oxford Edition of Dicey, J.W.F. Allison ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), vol.1, 12. 
2 Dicey, ibid. 10. 
3 Dicey, ibid. 11: A student ‘will discover that the very term “constitutional law”, which is not (unless my memory 
deceives me) ever employed by Blackstone, is of comparatively modern origin’. 
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claimed to have discovered a new branch of legal knowledge. Deploying a legal positivist method, 
he defined this new subject as one concerned to analyse ‘all rules which directly or indirectly affect 
the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in the state’.4  
Having re-orientated the object of study towards the rule order of the British state, Dicey 
confidently asserted that the basic rule of the constitution is expressed in ‘the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty’. This is the rule that the Crown-in-Parliament ‘has, under the English 
constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever; and, further, that no person or body 
is recognised ... as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament’.5 This 
foundational doctrine was presented as an objective and technical rule about the relative authority of 
sources of law.6  
Dicey’s great achievement is to have been the first to apply a rigorous juristic method to the 
study of the British constitution. This provided subsequent generations of lawyers with a clear and 
relatively simple framework of analysis. But that is not all: his discovery of the ‘law of the 
constitution’ also caused subsequent generations of lawyers, despite continuing to pay lip service 
to the evolutionary character of the British constitution,7 to regard the underlying basic law as of 
timeless authority.8 Notwithstanding developments since the late-nineteenth century which have 
transformed the character of modern government, lawyers continued to uphold his account of the 
basic rule.  
Continuing adherence to Dicey’s account, we argue, is now creating a ‘hopeless confusion 
both of language and of thought’ which flows from a failure to distinguish between the particularity 
of Dicey’s legal doctrine and the general concept of sovereignty. And the failure to recognise that his 
legal doctrine is inextricably tied to a particular political belief about authority is causing constitutional 
lawyers to become ‘perplexed by unreality’. 9  
We aim to substantiate these claims by differentiating Dicey’s legal doctrine from the general 
concept of sovereignty (sections III and IV) and then examining the contemporary consequences of 
this conflation (section V). But the political basis of the legal doctrine must first be explained (section 
II).  Our key point is that no sooner had Dicey finished criticizing those who eulogise rather than 
analyse than he revealed that his fundamental legal doctrine rested its authority on a particular political 
                                                          
4 Dicey, ibid. 20. 
5 Dicey, ibid. 27. 
6 Dicey, ibid. 27-49, Lecture II: ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament’.  
7 As did Dicey himself. See ibid. 10: ‘The present generation must of necessity look upon the constitution in a spirit 
different from the sentiment of either 1791 or of 1818’. The dates refer to the publication of works he cited by 
Burke and Hallam. 
8 See, eg, Nevil Johnson, ‘Dicey and his Influence on Public Law’ [1985] Public Law 717 at 719: ‘Dicey’s elegant 
simplification … carried the risk of tempting future generations to treat its terms as holy writ’. Cited by Allison in 
Dicey, above n 1, at xiv. 
9 The quoted phrase are those that Dicey applied to Blackstone’s account: Dicey, ibid. 12. 
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belief, one which he treated as an article of faith. He hinted at this when noting that ‘the omnipotence 
or undisputed supremacy throughout the whole country of the central government’ is a feature that 
has ‘at all times since the Norman Conquest characterised the political institutions of England’.10 But 
it came more clearly into view when, within a year of publishing The Law of the Constitution, he published 
the first of his three books opposing home rule in Ireland. In this work Dicey invoked sovereignty 
not as a legal doctrine but explicitly as a political precept. Here he argued that home rule, which 
evidently does not undermine the legal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, is nevertheless ‘a plan 
for revolutionising the constitution of the United Kingdom’.11 This type of claim can only stem from a 
political belief of the necessity of maintaining untrammelled authority at the centre. ‘Each successive 
generation from the reign of Edward I onwards’, he later explained, ‘has laboured to produce that 
complete political unity which is represented by the absolute sovereignty of the Parliament now sitting at 
Westminster’. This ‘political unity’ expresses what he called the ‘instinctive policy of English 
constitutionalists’. Sovereignty is here not being expressed as a formal doctrine; it is a political 
conviction about the need for an unrestricted central power. 
Notwithstanding his claim to be dispassionately presenting the law of the constitution, Dicey 
was making a politico-legal argument about sovereignty. His formal legal doctrine is inextricably tied 
to a substantive political conviction. And it is this politico-legal conception, we argue, that rapidly 
acquires the status of an article of faith among the British governing class.12  In blending the political 
and legal aspects of sovereignty in such an inchoate manner, Dicey presented as ‘the very key-
stone of the law of the constitution’13 a thoroughly ambiguous conception of sovereignty. 
Subsequent changes in the conditions of governing might cause us to question those political 
assumptions and in turn to qualify the meaning and status of the legal doctrine. But this has not 
happened; Dicey’s unacknowledged and highly particular conception of sovereignty is now 
preventing the British from thinking creatively about constitutional matters.  
  
II. The Evolution of the British Constitution 
 
The British are virtually unique in having retained a traditional constitution. This inheritance 
derives from the failure of the revolutionary upheavals of the 1640s to institute a robust system of 
republican government.  Consequently, after the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, a regime of 
aristocratic rule was established and that regime was then consolidated after 1689, extended fully 
                                                          
10 Dicey, ibid. 95. 
11 A.V. Dicey, England’s Case Against Home Rule (London: John Murray, 1886), 17 (emphasis supplied). See also n 54 
below. 
12 On its reception, see Allison in Dicey, above n Error! Bookmark not defined., xii-xvi. 
13 Dicey, above n 1, 41. 
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to Scotland after 1707, and entrenched after 1714. These developments ensured that the conflicts 
between the Crown and Parliament which had dogged seventeenth century constitutional struggles 
could be accommodated in the eighteenth century by establishing a system of government founded 
on the formally unlimited legislative power of a composite entity, the Crown-in-Council-in-
Parliament. This settlement was brought about by reforms that led to the authority of His Majesty’s 
Ministry being dependent on parliamentary support. Earlier conflicts between the Crown and 
Parliament were alleviated by transforming Parliament from its traditional role of acting as a check 
on government into one in which, operating in conjunction with the Ministry, it became the key 
instrument of British government.   
In 1765, Blackstone was able to explain that the basic principle underpinning this 
constitutional arrangement was that of parliamentary omni-competence.14 This principle had the 
singular merit of presenting an intelligible, condensed and formal norm of absolute centralized 
authority which at the same time permitted considerable flexibility to accommodate changing 
power relations between the various partners in authority. The formal principle established a clear 
rule of relative law-making authority. This remains the basis of the modern arrangement.15   But 
this formal principle otherwise left the basic constitutional questions unexamined. The British 
constitution continued to be understood as an evolving arrangement expressing the relative claims 
of the prerogatives of the Crown, the privileges of Parliament, and the liberties of the subject. 
Although eventually adopting ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ as the basic ‘doctrine’ of the ‘law of the 
constitution’, the British governing class had always recognized that the practical task of governing 
could not be resolved by appeal to abstract principle. Constitutional practice dictated that this 
formal right be tempered according to political conditions. 
The character of modern British government was thus shaped by the conjunction of 
absolute formal right and continuously evolving practice. The principle that there must reside a 
central authority possessing the highest power of command was not to be confused with the claim 
that Britain should be governed by the central authority. That this distinction between sovereignty 
and government was well understood is reflected in the tradition of English local government, 
according to which the centre left most matters of internal government in the hands of local 
                                                          
14 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1776), vol.1, bk.1, ch.2. 
15 See, eg, Duport Steels v Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142, at 157 (per Lord Diplock): ‘It cannot be too strongly emphasized 
that the British constitution, though largely unwritten, is firmly based on the separation of powers: Parliament makes 
the laws, the judiciary interprets them.’ The significance of the doctrine was reiterated by Lord Mustill in R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513, 567 D-F and again in R (on the application of 
Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, per Lord Carnwath, paras 252-255.   
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political elites.16 Similarly, when the Treaty of Union between England and Scotland of 1707 
established a common British legislative and executive authority, Scottish authorities were left with 
considerable autonomy with respect to domestic matters, especially those of religion, law, and 
education.17 And after the Treaty of Union with Ireland of 1800 the formal right of the 
Westminster Parliament to legislate was extended throughout the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, but actual governmental practice revealed a more complex and asymmetric set 
of governing arrangements than the hegemony of parliamentary sovereignty might have 
suggested.18 
The necessity of reconciling the simplicity of formal legislative supremacy and the 
complexity of governing practice was thrown into relief with respect to imperial government of 
the colonies. The practical limitations on the centre’s powers to rule, attributable to the sheer 
physical distances involved and the means of communication available, had ensured that 
indigenous self-governing practices were able to evolve in the settled colonies.19 Consequently, 
when the Seven Years’ War ended in 1763 and the Westminster Parliament broke with these 
customary arrangements and asserted its formal right to legislate for the colonies, it resulted in 
constitutional conflict, a war of independence, and eventually to the loss of Britain’s American 
colonies.  
This episode illustrates the limitations of sovereigntist thinking.20 The Westminster 
Parliament undoubtedly had the legal authority to pass the Declaratory Act of 1766 asserting its 
right to legislate for the colonies, but this could not alter the fact that many believed that Parliament 
was acting contrary to the unwritten imperial constitution that had been evolving.21 The issue, 
explained Edmund Burke, is ‘not whether you have a right to render your people miserable, but 
whether it is not in your interest to make them happy’; it ‘is not what a lawyer tells me I may do, 
                                                          
16 Émile Boutmy, The English Constitution (London: Macmillan, 1891), ch 4; Albert B. White, Self-government at the King’s 
Command: A Study in the Beginnings of English Democracy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1933); Martin 
Loughlin, Legality and Locality: The Role of Law in Central-Local Government Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 
ch1. 
17 A.V. Dicey and R.S. Rait, Thoughts on the Union between England & Scotland (London: Macmillan, 1920), 328-332. 
18 Alvin Jackson, The Two Unions:  Ireland, Scotland and the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707-2007 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 69-71, 188-193. 
19 Andrew C. McLaughlin, ‘The Background of American Federalism’ (1918) 12 American Political Science Review 215-
240, at 215: ‘the essential qualities of American federal organization were largely the product of the old British 
empire as it existed before 1764.’ 
20 See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1967), 198-229; 
Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United 
States, 1607-1788 (New York: Norton, 1986); John V. Jerierski, ‘Parliament or People: James Wilson and Blackstone 
on the Nature and Location of Sovereignty’ (1971) 32 J. of the History of Ideas 95-106. 
21 The lessons of the consensual union between England and Scotland were not learned in relation to the America. 
Notably, before the 1776 revolution, Scotland was the ‘constitutional ideal’ for the American colonies: C.H. 
McIlwain, The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation (New York: Macmillan, 1924), 80. 
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but what humanity, reason, and justice tell me I ought to do’.22 The American episode illustrates 
the point that constitutional understanding in the British tradition requires reconciliation of 
sovereign right and governmental practice. It suggests that a more comprehensive conception of 
sovereignty should entail not only recognition of the formal legal rule but also acknowledgement 
of the political legitimacy that underpins it.23 
This need for some such reconciliation was explicitly acknowledged at home, where it was 
manifest in the growing importance of ‘public opinion’.24 Rulers are generally able to realise their 
objectives, David Hume noted in 1742, only with the consent of the governed.25 Constitutional 
government is realised not through the assertion of an absolute right but through the judicious 
management of public opinion. During the eighteenth century, the British governing class came 
to recognise that the emerging party system was a powerful tool of public opinion management. 
The division between the Whigs and the Tories which came about during that period was designed 
mainly for the purpose of effectively managing the arrangements of parliamentary government. 
The emerging party system had the potential to reduce the Crown to little more than a cipher; this 
was because it not only ensured the establishment of a disciplined Ministry but also, as HM 
Opposition, an alternative government in waiting. It was through the formation of this party 
system that the main practices of government, what Dicey was later to label ‘constitutional 
conventions’, were worked out.26 Such arrangements could only have been formed in a 
parliamentary system which remained under the control of the landed class; only in this 
                                                          
22 Edmund Burke, ‘Speech on Conciliation with America, 22 March 1775’ in The Writings and Speeches of Edmund 
Burke, vol. III: Party, Parliament, and the American War 1774-1780 W.M. Elofson and J.A. Woods ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), 106-169, at 135.  
23 It might be noted that this was implicitly accepted by Dicey. See, eg, his ‘Introduction to 8th Edition’, above n 1, at 
426: ‘Parliament … had long before 1884 practically admitted the truth of the doctrine in vain pressed on his 
contemporaries by Burke, when insisting on the folly of the attempt made by the Parliament of England to exert as 
much absolute power in Massachusetts as in Middlesex, that a real limit to the exercise of sovereignty is imposed not 
by the laws of man but by the nature of things, and that it was vain for a parliamentary or any other sovereign to try 
and exert equal power throughout the whole of an immense Empire’. For an account of how Dicey’s formalism was 
modified to accommodate the political realities in the United Kingdom’s Dominions as they moved to 
independence, see P.C. Oliver, The Constitution of Independence: The Development of Constitutional Theory in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Mark D. Walters, ‘The British Legal Tradition in 
Canadian Constitutional Law’ in N. Des Rosiers, P. Macklem & P. Oliver (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian 
Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), ch 3. 
24 A.V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century (London: 
Macmillan, 1905); A. Lawrence Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 
1913); Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1934). 
25 David Hume, ‘Of the First Principles of Government’ [1742] in Essays Moral, Political and Literary (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1987), I.iv. 
26 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, above n 1, Pt III, ‘The Connection between the Law of the Constitution and the 
Conventions of the Constitution’. See further, Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: the rules and forms of political 
accountability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 48-53. 
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atmosphere of what Bagehot called ‘club government’27 could these conventional practices have 
been stabilized and institutionalized.  
During the nineteenth-century, the great challenge faced by the ruling class was to manage 
the coming of democracy.28 Could a gradual extension of the franchise be achieved while retaining 
faith in the ability of a parliamentary system moulded in an aristocratic era to represent the opinion 
of the nation? The main threat to that ambition was that the ‘common people’ would take up the 
claim made by the American colonists and push for more basic reforms founded on the conviction 
that sovereign authority ultimately rests not in the Parliament but in ‘the people’. By the end of the 
century, those fears had more or less dissipated. ‘Fifty years of reform have done their work’, 
declared Dicey in 1886, ‘and have removed the discontents, the divisions, the disaffection, and the 
conspiracies which marked the first quarter or first half of this century’.29 Consequently, he 
continued, ‘there exists in Europe no country so completely at unity with itself as Great Britain’.30 
The governing class’s success in managing the transition to democracy was subsequently signalled 
by the fact that after the First World War the Labour Party, formed in 1900 to promote the 
representation in Parliament of the industrial working class, had emerged to replace the Liberals 
in the two-party parliamentary system.  
The significance of this transition is of the first importance; it enabled Parliament to 
maintain its status as the voice of the political nation assembled.31 Dicey’s doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty was purely formal and he appreciated ‘that whatever lawyers may say the sovereign 
power of Parliament is not unlimited, and that King, Lords and Commons united do not possess 
… the utmost authority ascribable to any human institution’.32 He accepted that, in reality, there 
exist political limitations both external (deriving from the ‘possibility or certainty that his subjects, 
or a large number of them, will disobey or resist his laws’) and internal (deriving from the 
composition of the sovereign power) on the exercise of that formal power.33 But elsewhere Dicey 
                                                          
27 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution [1867] R.H.S. Crossman ed. (London: Fontana, 1963), 156: ‘Nobody will 
understand Parliament government who fancies it an easy thing, a natural thing, a thing not needing explanation. 
You have not a perception of the first elements in this matter till you know that government by a club is a standing 
wonder.’ 
28 See, eg, H.S. Maine, Popular Government (London: Murray, 1885), 97-98; Bagehot, ibid. 267-310 (‘Introduction to the 
Second Edition, 1872’). 
29 Dicey, England’s Case, above n 11, 151. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ralph Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour (London: Merlin Press, 2nd edn. 1972), 13: 
‘Of political parties claiming socialism to be their aim, the Labour Party has always been one of the most dogmatic – 
not about socialism, but about the parliamentary system. Empirical and flexible about all else, its leaders have always 
made devotion to that system their fixed point of reference and the conditioning factor of their political 
behaviour… [T]he leaders of the Labour Party have always rejected any kind of political action (such as industrial 
action for political purposes) which fell, or which appeared to them to fall, outside the framework and conventions 
of the parliamentary system.’ 
32 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, above n 1, 42. 
33 Ibid. 42-7. 
 8 
failed to maintain such a strict analytical distinction. In particular, the distinction he establishes 
between the legal doctrine and the political dimension of sovereignty all but collapses once he 
confronted the greatest constitutional challenge of his day. 
It is in his response to Ireland’s home rule claims that the elision between legal doctrine 
and political conviction is most prominently exhibited. In the course of advocating the Unionist 
case, Dicey explicitly blends these dimensions. ‘Under all the formality, the antiquarianism, the 
shams of the British constitution’, he asserts, ‘there lies an element of power which has been the 
true source of its life and growth’.34 The ‘secret source’ of this strength ‘is the absolute 
omnipotence, the sovereignty, of Parliament’.35 Situated within this source, he explains, we find 
‘constitutional theory and constitutional practice … for once at one’.36 Dicey here claims that 
sovereignty is ‘at bottom, nothing else but unlimited power’ and the ‘pliability’ contained in the 
English formulation is ‘essential to the maintenance by England of the British Empire’.37 
Consequently, the threat presented by home rule is not that it undermines the legal doctrine; the 
threat is that it would ‘dislocate every English constitutional arrangement’. That is, it would 
‘weaken the power of Great Britain’ and ‘would assuredly weaken the Government quite as much 
as the Legislature’.38  That this is the assertion of the political conviction that unfettered power 
must for reasons of state be maintained by the central authority is reinforced by Dicey’s claim that 
‘Home Rule in Ireland is more dangerous to England than Irish independence’.39 
Our contention, then, is that, though unacknowledged, the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty that is widely adopted in the twentieth century is not simply a formal legal rule 
expressing the primacy of legislation; it also acquires the status of a shibboleth, a widely held 
politico-cultural belief about the necessity of maintaining - untrammelled and inter-twined - 
political power and legal authority at the centre.40 Although leading Victorian commentators such 
                                                          
34 Dicey, England’s Case, above n 11, 168. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 168-9. 
37 Ibid. 169-70. 
38 Ibid. 173. 
39 Ibid. 6. 
40 It is accepted that this claim cannot be demonstrated beyond doubt without detailed examination of practice and 
this type of study cannot be undertaken here. Consider only this: the two most important constitutional questions 
that the UK has faced over the last 50 years concern relations between the several nations of the UK and the UK’s 
relationship with what is now the European Union. In each of these cases, both the political debate as well as the 
legal analysis invariably has come to focus on the claim that sovereignty, which is taken to mean parliamentary 
sovereignty, must always remain unencumbered. The formal legal doctrine is intertwined with the evident political 
merits of a unitary system in establishing the parameters of constitutional debate. See Report of the Royal Commission on 
the Constitution 1969-1973, Cmnd 5460 (London: HMSO, 1973), vol.1, para 539: ‘we have concluded that if 
government in the United Kingdom is to meet the present-day needs of the people it is necessary for the undivided 
sovereignty of Parliament to be maintained. We believe that only within the general ambit of one supreme elected 
authority is it likely that there will emerge the degree of unity, co-operation and flexibility which common sense 
suggests is desirable.’ And: ‘the UK Parliament is, and will remain, sovereign in all matters … Westminster will be 
choosing to exercise that sovereignty in devolving legislative responsibilities to a Scottish Parliament without in any 
 9 
as Dicey and Bagehot recognized that the singular merit of the British constitution ‘is that it is no 
constitution at all’41 and that ‘the object is in constant change’,42 by the twentieth century a myth 
had grown up around the idea that parliamentary sovereignty in its general politico-legal meaning 
is the constitution’s defining characteristic. The formal legal positivist conception had absorbed 
the political conviction in a manner that masked the failure to develop a more comprehensive 
explanation of sovereignty that was able adequately to accommodate its legal and political 
dimensions. 
 
III The Peculiarities of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
 
In The Law of the Constitution Dicey states that ‘the sovereignty of Parliament is (from a legal point 
of view) the dominant characteristic of our political institutions’ and ‘that its existence is a legal 
fact’.43 But in his Introduction to the eighth edition in 1915 he moved beyond legal formalities and 
indicated that the power located in Westminster is an undeniable political fact. ‘No constitutional 
arrangements or fictions’, he argued, ‘could get rid of the fact that England would, after as before 
the establishment of Home Rule all round, continue [to be], in virtue of her resources and her 
population, the predominant partner throughout the United Kingdom, and the partner on whom 
sovereignty had been conferred’.44 This sovereign power, he emphasized, is conferred ‘not by the 
language of any statute or other document, but by the nature of things’.45 The Westminster 
Parliament is sovereign, he was indicating, not because of its status in a hierarchically ordered rule 
system; it is sovereign by virtue of its position in a power system. That is, the law of the constitution 
relies for its authority on power and material force; the validity and efficacy of legal order rests on 
an underlying constituent power. 
Dicey here presents an explicitly political account of sovereignty. But however it is 
conceived, sovereignty is not in any strict sense a fact: it is a concept. Sovereignty expresses the 
quality of a particular mode of political association. The concept first came into common usage in 
the early-modern period when the most pressing political issue was to identify the locus of 
government authority. It is for this reason that sovereignty is often associated with the belief that 
                                                          
way diminishing its own powers. The Government recognised that no UK Parliament can bind its successors’. 
‘Scotland’s Parliament’ (Cm 3658, 1997), para. 4.2. 
41 Ibid.169. 
42 Bagehot, above n 27, 267. 
43 Dicey, above n 1, 27. 
44 Dicey, above n 1, 473-4. 
45 Ibid. 474. 
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there must exist some ultimate power that protects the political order.46 That idea was most clearly 
expressed in the claim that a ‘sovereign’ ruler meant a ruler who was not legally obligated to any 
other power, such as the Emperor or the Papacy. The ruler’s ‘sovereignty’ signified independence 
from any higher authority. Sovereign rulers exercised absolute formal legal authority over their 
subjects.  
This feature of absolute formal legal authority is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
of sovereignty, which is as much about autonomy as about power.  The idea of sovereignty emerges 
only once it is acknowledged that governing is a complex undertaking that is qualitatively different 
from personal rule. That is, the sovereign ruler occupies a representative office. And once it was 
recognized that the office of the king represents the ‘community of the realm’, the way was open 
for the office of the ruler (the Crown) to be institutionalized. This was accomplished through a 
process of functional differentiation, during which it was recognized that the ‘sovereign’ tasks of 
governing could be exercised not by the person of the king but only through the king in his public 
capacity. These sovereign powers could only be exercised through certain institutional forms.47  
Institutionalization of the office of the king runs through the contours of English 
constitutional development. The tasks of governing thus came to be exercised variously through 
the king-in-council, the king-in-council-in-parliament, the king’s ministers, and the king’s courts. 
Sovereignty expressed the absolute legal authority of the ruling power, but this meant the ruling 
power in its corporate capacity. The king as such never possessed sovereignty: only after the 
establishment of relatively stable institutional arrangements through which the powers of the 
Crown were to be exercised could lawyers talk about the sovereign character of that office.  
The modern doctrine, that acts of the Crown-in-Parliament are the highest expression of 
law, was achieved in stages. The English Reformation, cutting off the secular power of the Church 
in Rome, marked one important milestone, not least because the king in this exercise of statecraft 
felt obliged to make use of the Parliament.48 But it was during the seventeenth-century conflicts 
that the critical ‘struggle for sovereignty’ occurred, the outcome of which then shaped the modern 
legal doctrine as Parliament and Government were fused in the concept of the Crown-in-
Parliament as a monolithic sovereign authority.49 Only in the late-eighteenth century was the 
                                                          
46 See, eg, Bagehot, above n 27, 214: ‘Hobbes told us long ago, and everybody now understands, that there must be 
a supreme authority, a conclusive power, in every State on every point somewhere’. 
47 See Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch.5. The development of the 
concept is examined in more detail in Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
esp. 64-75, 117-119, 184-186. 
48 See, eg, Ferrers’ case (1543); excerpted in G.R. Elton (ed.), The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 267-70, at 270 (per Henry VIII): ‘We at no time stand so highly in 
our estate royal as in the time of Parliament; wherein we as head and you as members are conjoined and knit 
together into one body politic’. 
49 Joyce L. Malcolm, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth Century English Political Tracts (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 
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century’s leading jurist able to express the principle that the Crown-in-Parliament has ‘sovereign 
and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, 
reviving, and expounding the laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical, 
or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal’.50 And only in the late-nineteenth century was 
that century’s leading jurist to proclaim the ‘doctrine’ as the foundation of the ‘law of the 
constitution’.51 
Developments in the twentieth century throw into relief the peculiar character of the 
doctrine. Its distinctive feature was that, notwithstanding the eventual establishment of a regime 
of representative democracy, its monarchical form was retained. That is, adjustment to these 
changing political realities was accomplished not by foundational re-constitution but only by a re-
arrangement in the status of the partners in the corporate entity of the Crown-in-Parliament. ‘As 
to the mode in which King, Lords, and Commons were to divide the sovereign power between 
themselves’, noted Dicey, ‘there have been at different times disputes leading to civil war; but that 
Parliament – that is, the Crown, the Peers, and the Commons acting together – is absolutely 
supreme, has never been doubted’.52 That remained the case throughout the twentieth century. 
The loss of its veto power in the eighteenth century had meant that the monarch’s role became 
largely ceremonial and the decline of hereditary authority in the nineteenth century led gradually 
to a diminution in the role of the House of Lords and the retention in the twentieth century only 
of a power to revise and delay. But despite these changes, the doctrine of the ultimate authority of 
the Crown-in-Parliament was not simply retained but strengthened. The modern period marks the 
apotheosis of the doctrine. ‘In England’, noted Dicey in 1915, ‘democratic government has already 
given votes, if not precisely supreme power, to citizens’.53 It has not given supreme power to 
citizens because that supreme power remains encased in a monarchical form.54  
The singularity of this process of modernisation is highlighted through comparison. In 
European legal thought the continuing evolution of governing arrangements - through 
institutionalization, internal differentiation and corporatization of the office of the sovereign – 
                                                          
1999), 2 vols. 
50 Blackstone, above n.14, 156. 
51 Cf. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), a work 
that seeks to demonstrate ‘that the doctrine is considerably older than [the mid-nineteenth century]: it has been 
accepted by a large majority of English lawyers since the 1640s’ (at 7). Goldsworthy’s historical study provides a 
valuable corrective to the recent claims of ‘common law constitutionalism’ (below at XX: [text at nn104, 105]), but 
his claim in reality concerns the concrete notion of parliamentary supremacy rather than the modern abstract idea of 
sovereignty. It is, in the words of one reviewer of the work, ‘a fine description that begs almost every conceivable 
theoretical question about sovereignty’:  Fred Nash, [2000] 48 Political Studies 1052.  
52 Dicey, England’s Case, above n 11, 168. 
53 Dicey, Intro to 8th edn., above n 1, 453. 
54 See Martin Loughlin, ‘The State, the Crown and the Law’ in Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne (eds), The Nature of 
the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 33-76. 
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required a distinction to be drawn between the sovereign powers of governing and the concept of 
sovereignty itself. Specifically, the sovereign powers of rule could be divided, and indeed must be 
so divided, but sovereignty, the absolute authority of the ruling power, could not. This distinction 
became of intense practical significance as a consequence of the overthrow of feudal orders during 
modern revolutionary upheavals. Once the idea gained a foothold that sovereign right was not 
bestowed from ‘above’ (by God) but was conferred from ‘below’ (by ‘the people’), the claim of 
‘popular sovereignty’ could be asserted. This may have been an ambiguous, if not paradoxical, idea, 
not least because the people exist qua people - that is, as the bearers of sovereignty - only once 
governing arrangements have been established. But it was only through this shift in the basis of 
symbolic representation that modern constitutional reconstruction could be effected.  
The significance of this development is that in the modern world sovereignty is a concept 
expressing the absolute character of the power and authority created through an exercise of 
constitutional imagination. Sovereignty vests neither in the ruler (such as the king), nor in the 
corporate office of government (such as the Crown-in-Parliament), nor in the people (as claims of 
popular sovereignty suggest). As an expression of the absolute authority of an imaginative 
engagement of self-government of a political nation, sovereignty is exhibited in the process of 
settling institutional arrangements through an exercise of collective political will. 
 The modern concept of sovereignty expresses a set of relations. These relations have 
intrinsically political and legal dimensions. Sovereignty is the regulatory idea that enables us first 
to conceive of an autonomous political domain and then to be able to express that in legal terms. 
The political dimension is power-generational and the legal is power-distributive. The crucial point 
is that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is purely legal: it expresses the principle that there 
is no legal limitation on the jurisdictional competence of Parliament and that an Act of the Crown-
in-Parliament is the highest expression of (positive) law. But this legal doctrine rests on the political 
– or power-generational – dimension. This latter dimension connotes power that is created as a 
result of the symbolic drawing together of a multitude into a ‘people’ or a ‘nation’. It is this power 
that must be harnessed through distinctive institutional forms, the most basic of which is the state, 
a complex juristic entity comprising three essential aspects: territory, people, and ruling authority.55 
Sovereignty, then, is an essential characteristic of the nation-state. Every sovereign state 
possesses supreme, unlimited and indivisible authority. There can be no limitation on a state’s 
authority to rule by means of law. But almost all regimes have now adopted modern constitutions 
that allocate the ‘sovereign’ tasks of governing among particular institutions, such as the legislature, 
executive and judiciary. And since the jurisdictional competence of each of these governmental 
                                                          
55 See further Loughlin, Foundations, above n 47, ch 7. 
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institutions is limited by its constitution, no institution possesses an ultimate authority to rule. Far 
from amounting to a limitation on sovereignty, constitutional arrangements that divide 
governmental powers between legislative, executive and judicial authorities or which divide powers 
territorially in federal schemes involve an explication of the sovereign authority of ‘the people’ as 
the bearer of ‘constituent power’.  
Owing to the singular character of British governmental development, British lawyers 
often display symptoms of confusion about sovereignty. Having lived so long with the authority 
of the legal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, they wrongly assume it is definitive of the 
concept. They fail to appreciate that a conflation has taken place because Parliament is at once 
conceived to be a legislature and a constituent assembly,56 and that ‘if the principle of the 
supremacy of Parliament is translated into continental terminology, it amounts to what is otherwise 
called the “sovereignty of the state”’.57 A specific legal doctrine concerning the status of the 
legislation enacted in the Westminster Parliament is confused with a political-constitutional 
principle whereby the relative authority of governmental institutions in the constitution of the state 
is filtered through the supremacy of the state itself as ultimate source of legitimacy and authority.58 
The former expresses a legal, power-distributive principle while the latter is a consequence of a 
political, power-generative principle. And when the conditions upon which the power-generative 
principle works alter, so too must the meaning and status of the legal doctrine. 
 
IV Questioning Diceyan Sovereignty 
 
The error British lawyers commonly make is to fail to draw a distinction between sovereignty and 
government. Sovereignty is a principle of unity: it expresses illimitability, perpetuity, and 
indivisibility of the ruling authority of a state. Any limit on sovereignty eradicates it, any division 
of sovereignty destroys it. But sovereignty must not be confused with particular institutional forms 
of government. There is, noted Bodin, a ‘great difference between the state and the government 
                                                          
56 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America [1835] H. Reeve trans., D. J. Boorstin intro. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1990), vol.1, 100. The elision of the two dimensions caused theoretical problems for the United Kingdom’s Dominions 
in the late nineteenth century, insofar as a narrative was needed to justify the role of the UK Parliament – as an external 
legislature - in amending Dominion constitutions. To overcome this legitimacy gap, constitutional theorists referred 
overtly to Westminster as ‘a constitutional assembly’ and ‘the constitution-maker for the colonies’: see W.H.P. Clement, 
The Law of the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Carswell, 1892) (3rd ed., 1916), 29 and 32, cited by P.C. Oliver, 
‘Parliamentary Sovereignty, Federalism and the Commonwealth’ in Robert Schütze and Stephen Tierney (eds), The 
United Kingdom and the Federal Idea (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018), 49-72. 
57 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Constitutionalism: a preliminary discussion’ (1962) 56 American Political Science Review 853-64, at 
854. 
58 See further Loughlin, Idea of Public Law, above n 47, 88-91. 
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of the state’,59 and unless it is maintained we will be thrown ‘headlong into an infinite labyrinth of 
errors’.60 This is the source of error of those jurists who conflate the general concept with a 
particular rule and assume that the doctrine that determines the status of an Act of Parliament is 
definitive of the concept of sovereignty. 
 This conflation, mainly attributable to Britain’s unusual constitutional history, leads to 
errors of an elementary nature, such as the idea that the institutional division of governmental 
competences (in a formal written constitution) or the establishment of federalism is incompatible 
with, rather than an explication of, sovereignty. It is necessary to undertake a reconceptualization 
of the concept, and for this we must return to Dicey’s arguments, particularly his sustained 
opposition to home rule in Ireland.  
Notwithstanding the fact that Irish home rule bills included provisions retaining the 
‘supreme power and authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom’ to legislate for Ireland, 
Dicey maintained that they contemplated the establishment of a federal arrangement in which ‘the 
supremacy of the Imperial Parliament will virtually and in truth … be destroyed’.61 His argument 
was that Parliament loses sovereignty because it relinquishes the right to govern, a power that in a 
strict sense is not vested in Parliament. He argues, further, that although Parliament retains the 
right to abolish the home rule scheme, this right has a different source.62 Dicey’s reasoning on this 
point is revealing. The power to remove these home rule provisions, he maintains, is not strictly 
given by Act of Parliament: ‘It is given to Great Britain, not by enactment but by nature; it arises 
from the inherent capacity of a strong, a flourishing, a populous, and a wealthy country to control 
or coerce a neighbouring island which is poor, divided, and weak’.63  
With this admission, the basis of Dicey’s political jurisprudence is made explicit: the ‘law 
of the constitution’, he is saying, ultimately depends for the source of its authority on material 
power. This is later reinforced in a remarkably frank statement:  
 
                                                          
59 Jean Bodin, The Six Bookes of a Commonweale [1576] R. Knolles trans. 1606, K.D. McRae ed. (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1962), 199. 
60 Bodin, ibid. 249-50; see further Martin Loughlin. ‘Why Sovereignty?’ in R. Rawlings, P. Leyland & A. Young (eds), 
Sovereignty and Law: Domestic, Regional & Global Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 34-49.  
61 A.V. Dicey, Fool’s Paradise, being a Constitutionalist’s Criticism of the Home Rule Bill of 1912 (London: John Murray, 
1913), 63, 66. The term ‘supremacy’ rather than ‘sovereignty’ might seem ambiguous, but it is clear that he uses the 
terms interchangeably. See, eg, ibid at 69: ‘the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament will suffer an immense 
diminution’. In 1882 he wrote that federalism ‘revolutionises the whole constitution of the United Kingdom; by 
undermining parliamentary sovereignty, it deprives English institutions of their elasticity, their strength, and their life’ 
(emphasis added). A.V. Dicey, ‘Home Rule from an English Point of View,’ Contemporary Review (July 1882), 66-86, 
84.  
62 A.V. Dicey, A Leap in the Dark, or Our New Constitution (London: John Murray, 1893), 31-32. See further, A. 
Jackson, ‘The Failure of British and Irish Federalism, c.1800-1950’ in Schütze and Tierney, above n.56, 29-47.  
63 Dicey, A Leap, ibid. 29. The appending note states: ‘This is the only sense in which the sovereignty of the Imperial 
Parliament is inalienable’. 
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The various forms of the English Constitution have, on the whole, possessed the immense 
merit of giving at each period of our history political authority into the hands of the class, 
or classes, who made up the true strength of the nation. Right has in a rough way been 
combined with might. Wherever this is not the case, and genuine power is not endowed 
with political authority, there exists a sure cause of revolution; for sooner or later the 
natural forces of any society must assert their predominance. No institution will stand 
which does not correspond with the nature of things.64  
 
Parliamentary sovereignty may be the fundamental doctrine of the ‘law of the constitution’, he is 
saying, but there exists a more basic conception of sovereignty that expresses ‘the nature of things’. 
Dicey here acknowledges the distinction between constituted power and constituent power and 
asserts the primacy of the latter, a primacy which is not simply a matter of political fact but an 
inherent feature of the constitutional doctrine of sovereignty which, to be meaningful, must 
embrace its political and legal dimensions.  
Once this is made explicit, his otherwise confused argument against home rule in Ireland 
is clarified. Since the scheme envisages the retention of Parliamentary sovereignty, home rule is 
not contrary to the legal doctrine.65 Dicey’s objections are that home rule for Ireland will breed 
further division within Ireland, will make the strong element in the community subordinate to the 
weak,66 and will ‘weaken the power of Great Britain’.67 To Ireland, he says, ‘will be given power 
without responsibility, to England, responsibility without power’.68 His argument against home 
rule is not that of a positivist lawyer advising that it offends a basic rule of constitutional law. It is 
an explicitly political argument based on a conviction that home rule for Ireland will create conflict 
in Ireland and weaken Great Britain. It recognises that the status of the legal rule draws its authority 
from political conditions, that the form of the constituted power derives from the workings of the 
constituent power, and that the constitutional meaning of sovereignty cannot be derived solely 
from its legal formulation.  
                                                          
64 Dicey, ibid. 127. 
65 As James Bryce, a parliamentarian and follower of Dicey, put it: ‘We shall retain as a matter of pure right the 
power to legislate for Ireland, for all purposes whatsoever, for the simple reason that we cannot divest ourselves of 
it.’ Parliamentary Debates (10 May 1886), quoted in Geoffrey Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 65-66. See also Christopher Harvie, ‘Ideology and Home Rule: James Bryce, A. V. 
Dicey and Ireland, 1880-1887’ (1976) 91 English Historical Review 298-314. 
66 Dicey, Leap, above n.62, 128: ‘In Ireland Dublin is made supreme over Belfast, the South is made not the equal, 
but in effect the master of the North; ignorance is given dominion over education, poverty is allowed to dispose of 
wealth. If Ireland were an independent state, or even a self-governed British colony, things would right themselves. 
But the politicians who are to rule in Dublin will not depend on their own resources or be checked by a sense of 
their own feebleness. They will be constitutionally and legally entitled to the support of the British Army; they will 
constitute the worst form of government of which the world has had experience, a government which relying for its 
existence on the aid of an external power finds in its very feebleness support for tyranny.’ 
67 Dicey, England’s Case, above n 11, 173. 
68 Dicey, Leap, above n 62, 130. 
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Our objective is not to pass judgement on the soundness of Dicey’s argument; it is only to 
demonstrate that the law of the constitution he expounded drew its authority from contingent 
political conditions. And it is change in those political conditions, it would appear, that caused him 
to assert that ‘no fundamental change in the constitution’ should be made ‘which has not received 
the undoubted assent of the nation’.69 In relation to Gladstone’s 1893 Irish Home Rule Bill, he 
maintained that although this principle imposes a special obligation on the House of Lords, such 
a basic proposed change might also require ‘a direct appeal to the electors in the nature of a 
Referendum’.70 For a jurist who founded his scholarly reputation on the claim that ‘the true 
constitutional law is his only real concern’ and that ‘[h]is proper function is to show what are the 
legal rules (i.e. the rules recognised by the Courts) which are to be found in the several part of the 
constitution’,71 this is a remarkable assertion.  He blithely concedes as much, stating that: 
This course, it may be said, is unconstitutional. This word has no terrors for me; it means 
no more than unusual, and the institution of a Referendum would simply mean the formal 
acknowledgement of the doctrine which lies at the basis of English democracy – that a law 
depends at bottom for its enactment on the assent of the nation as represented by the 
electors.72  
 
Far from adhering to the professor’s duty ‘to state what are the laws which form part of the 
constitution, to arrange them in their order, to explain their meaning, and to exhibit where possible 
their logical connection’,73 Dicey was claiming that his analysis must ‘bring into prominence the 
sovereignty of the nation’.74 Recognizing the primacy of constituent power, he felt impelled to 
look beyond the rules of the constitution and ‘override the practices to protect the principles of 
the constitution’.75 Whatever else this might signify, it marks a reversion to his acceptance of the 
idea that the British constitution is a continually evolving phenomenon, and that the meaning of 
the constitution is broader than the content of constitutional law. 
Dicey’s renewed focus on constituent power acquired an enhanced significance in 1914 in 
the context of his opposition to the third home rule bill. Having identified ‘the rule of law’ as the 
second basic principle of constitutional law,76 it is not surprising that he asserts a ‘paramount duty 
to obey the law of the land’.77 What is surprising, though, is his preparedness to qualify that duty: 
‘such obedience’, he argues, ‘can be due only when the law is the clear and undoubted expression 
                                                          
69 Dicey, Leap, ibid. 198. 
70 Dicey, Leap, ibid. 198. 
71 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, above n 1, 23. 
72 Dicey, Leap, above n 62, 199. 
73 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, above n 1, 24. 
74 Dicey, Leap, above n 62, 199. 
75 Dicey, Leap, ibid. 199-200. 
76 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, above n 1, 25, 95-119. 
77 Dicey, Fool’s Paradise, above n 61, 143. 
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of the will of the nation’.78 His immediate concern was that, having been rejected by the Lords, 
the Government might use the Parliament Act 1911 to pass the Home Rule Bill into law. Were 
this to occur without the scheme having first being put to the electorate, Dicey claimed, the Act 
‘will be in the form of a law, but will lack all constitutional authority, and the duty of Unionists will 
be to treat it as a measure which lacks the sanction of the nation’.79 
Inventing the concept of ‘the mandate’, a rule unknown to British constitutional law, he 
argued that any attempt ‘to pass a Home Rule Act without any appeal to the electorate violates the 
whole spirit of our existing constitutional government’.80 Contrary to his warning to lawyers against 
reliance on ‘political understandings’ of governmental practices whose ‘speculative solution 
belongs to the province of political theorists’,81 he readily engages in precisely this type of exercise. 
But he does not stop there. When he asserts that ‘there may exist acts of oppression on the part 
of a democracy … which justify resistance to law, or, in other words, rebellion’,82 he comes close 
to advocating violent resistance. When the ‘unity of the nation is at stake’, he maintains, ‘[w]e must 
resist Home Rule as the Northern States of America resisted Secession’.83 The threat of oppression 
being envisaged, he concludes, might require invoking an ‘old Whig doctrine’ which ‘might justify 
what was technically conspiracy or rebellion’.84 And his only caveat is that ‘no loyal citizens should, 
until all possibility of legal resistance is exhausted, have recourse to the use of arms’.85  
 During the twentieth century, Dicey’s doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty acquired the 
status of orthodoxy. But once the conditions of its formulation are examined it becomes clear that, 
far from being an objective legal concept, it is a politico-legal construct whose constitutional 
standing depends on being closely tied to a political belief that sovereign authority must be located 
in a central institution holding unlimited power. This point has commonly been obscured by the 
widespread acceptance of Dicey’s analytical method, notwithstanding the fact that his political 
convictions actually worked to erode the authority of that method.86 Having adopted this politico-
legal conception of parliamentary sovereignty as an article of faith, constitutional lawyers acquired 
a skewed appreciation of the concept, invariably treating the formal doctrine as definitive of 
sovereignty’s meaning. It is only by recognizing that the legal doctrine is the peculiar product of 
                                                          
78 Ibid. 143. 
79 Ibid. 147. 
80 Ibid. 153. 
81 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, above n 1, 19. 
82 Dicey, Fool’s Paradise, above n 61, 143. 
83 Ibid. 144. 
84 Ibid. 155-6. 
85 Ibid. 157. See further Iain McLean, What’s Wrong with the British Constitution? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), chs 5-7. 
86 Note, for example, how little prominence is given to his writing on home rule in the Oxford Edition of Dicey, above 
n 1, a two volume work that, according to the dustjacket blurb, ‘provides sources with which to reassess the 
extraordinary and lasting influence of Dicey’s canonical text’. 
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specific historical circumstances and particular political convictions, that the space opens up for 
examining how continuing evolutionary developments might qualify that doctrine. 
 
V Reconceptualising Sovereignty 
 
How, it might be asked, are developments in government leading to a reconceptualization of the 
meaning of sovereignty within British constitutional understanding? Our central argument is that 
changes over the last fifty years have now rendered incoherent the idea that the Diceyan doctrine 
provides a cogent account of the exercise of sovereign legal powers within the British state. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Dicey himself had already acknowledged that tensions between 
the political and legal aspects required some qualification of the legal doctrine. Yet this did not 
prevent the doctrine’s survival, not least because, after the partial resolution of the Irish question 
in the 1920s, the political basis of the claim to absolute parliamentary sovereignty was not put 
under strain again for decades. The political authority of the House of Commons, wearing its ill-
fitting hat as embodiment of the people’s constituent power, went largely unchallenged and only 
since the 1970s has the ability of the Commons to express the authentic and authoritative will of 
the British people progressively waned.  
This loss of authority is reflected in several structural factors. First, the authority of the 
Commons has been undermined by a decline in electoral turnout in parliamentary elections,87 by 
the erosion of party membership in the past half century,88 by the decline of trust in parliamentary 
representatives revealed in a series of scandals,89 and by the abdication of its law-making role to 
the executive through the delegation of open-ended secondary law-making powers.90 Secondly, 
there has been a growing disaggregation of the cultural-political notion of the ‘British people’,91 
                                                          
87 Turnout in general elections was generally above 75 per cent from 1950-1992 but dropped to 59.4 per cent in 
2001. It has remained below 70 per cent since then, although the trend has been improving, peaking at 68.7 per cent 
in 2017. ‘Turnout at Elections’, House of Commons Library Paper, CBP 8060, 26 July 2017.  
88 In 1953 the Conservative Party had 2.8 million members and the Labour Party over 1 million. The Conservatives 
dropped to approximately 150,000 members by the end of 2013 and Labour suffered a similar dip until a sharp 
increase to over 500,000 ahead of the 2015 leadership election. Membership of UK Political Parties, House of Commons 
Library Briefing Paper No. SN05125, 1 September 2017. 
89 Those declaring trust in politicians and government declined from nearly 40 per cent to below 20 per cent 
between 1974 and 2003: C. Bromley, J. Curtice and B. Seyd, ‘Is  Britain Facing a Crisis of Democracy?’ (London: 
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Strathclyde Review, HL Paper 116, 23 March 2016; id., The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and Delegated Powers, HL Paper 123,  7 
March 2017; Lord Judge, ‘Ceding Power to the Executive: The Resurrection of Henry VIII’, Lecture, King’s 
College, London, 12 April 2016. 
91 ‘Devolution: Identities and Constitutional Preferences across the UK’ in Park et al (eds.), British Social Attitudes: The 
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reflected in demands for the devolution of more and more governing powers to the non-English 
regions of the state. Thirdly, there has been a growing use of referendums92 to determine the ‘will 
of the people’ or ‘peoples’93 of the UK And, finally, there has been a dissipation of authority away 
from central political institutions, manifest in the growing impact of post-parliamentary politics,94 
and the emergence of transnational networks of government on the global stage operating at some 
distance from traditional parliamentary oversight.95 The cumulative effect has been to reveal that 
Parliament – essentially the Commons – is no longer able to present itself as the authoritative voice 
of the political nation. Once the claim that the Commons embodies ‘the true strength of the nation’ 
starts to be contested, then the power-generative aspect of sovereignty is modified and it is in ‘the 
nature of things’ that the legal doctrine must also be qualified.96  
That these developments have been shielded from legal view owes much to the prevailing 
influence within British thought of a legal positivist philosophy. Dicey’s legalism had driven a 
wedge between the historian’s method of ‘ascertaining the steps by which a constitution has grown 
to be what it is’ and the lawyer’s aim to discern ‘the law as it now stands’, that is, between ‘political 
understandings’ and ‘rules of law’.97 When Dicey claimed that ‘understandings are not laws, and 
that no system of conventionalism will explain the whole nature of constitutional law’,98 he severed 
the generative and the distributive, the conditions of ‘political right’ from positive law, the 
constitution of the state from a formal legal conception of ‘the law of the constitution’, and the 
relational aspects of sovereignty from the formal legal doctrine. And although Dicey himself had 
dimly acknowledged the linkage, the widespread adoption of his legal method – of stating the laws, 
arranging them in order and demonstrating their logical connection – erected a major barrier to 
understanding.  
This is not to suggest that constitutional lawyers have not examined the deficiencies of the 
legal doctrine or presented alternative formulations that qualify the Diceyan notion. The point is 
that, not connecting the legal and the political in an appropriate way, they have been unable to 
offer cogent reasons for conceptual adjustment.99 Consider, for example, the efforts of scholars 
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such as W.I. Jennings and R.F.V. Heuston to promote a ‘manner and form’ thesis, that is, an 
argument that Parliament is able under certain conditions, to bind itself as to the form of 
subsequent legislation.100 Being advocated earlier in the century, and therefore prior to the 
institutional developments of the last fifty years, their arguments remained speculative and 
contentious and their cogent arguments ultimately foundered over the failure to provide an 
appropriate justification for the thesis.  
Recognizing that the formal legal doctrine could not be equated to sovereignty,101 Jennings 
came closest to identifying the critical issue. But because he adopted a sociological positivist 
method that rejected any form of metaphysical inquiry, he was unable to rest his argument on the 
operations of political right. Consequently, although accepting that the legal doctrine derived from 
a political fact, he also felt obliged to recognize that ‘the power of a legislature derives from the 
law by which it is established’.102 In most countries that law is expressed in the basic constitutional 
law and therefore in the institutionalized conditions of political right. Lacking access to this type 
of argument, Jennings felt obliged to accept that in the United Kingdom, ‘which has no written 
Constitution’, that source must derive ‘from the accepted law, which is the common law’.103 And 
this equation of political right with common law avoids serious examination of the critical question 
of the constitution of political authority. 
Heuston, by contrast, promoted the manner and form thesis both as a logical requirement 
and a moral imperative. Rightly recognising that sovereignty is a concept, he maintained that ‘the 
rules which identify the sovereign and prescribe its composition and functions are logically prior 
to it’.104 But again, rather than examining how les principes du droit politique might do their work, 
Heuston simply asserted that the authority of these logically prior rules was founded on a moral 
principle, the protection against the abuse of absolute sovereign authority.105  
                                                          
constitutional changes brought about by the Labour Government after 1997, felt obliged to fall back upon the idea of 
the Commons as the authentic voice of the political nation: ‘the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, seen from a 
modern perspective, is properly to be viewed as an expression of the political sovereignty of the people’. Lord Irvine of 
Lairg, ‘Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and America’ (2001) 76 New York University 
Law Review 1-22, 14. 
100 W.I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution [1933] (London: University of London Press, 5th edn 1959), ch 4; 
R.F.V. Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law (London: Stevens, 2nd edn., 1964), ch 1. 
101 Jennings, ibid. 149: ‘legal sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. It is not supreme power. It is a legal concept, a 
form of expression which lawyers use to express the relations between Parliament and the courts.’ 
102 Jennings, ibid. 156. 
103 Jennings, ibid.  
104 Heuston, above n.100, 6. 
105 Heuston, ibid, 30-1: ‘[T]he new doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is more than a striking affirmation of the 
supremacy of the law in times of stress… The great advantage of the new doctrine is that it enables these 
tremendous issues to be decided according to the ordinary law in the ordinary courts. By redefining the doctrine of 
sovereignty from within its own four corners the common law has shown its instinctive wisdom’. 
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Today, certain judges and scholars are beginning, for good reasons, to acknowledge the 
cogency of the manner and form thesis. But following Jennings in assuming that these prior rules 
are aspects of the common law,106 and following Heuston in giving a moral interpretation of their 
basis,107 they seek to justify the doctrine not as an expression of contemporary conditions of 
relational sovereignty but as a product of the intrinsic moral reasoning of the common law.  
 Our argument is that institutional developments over the last half-century have eroded the 
foundations of Dicey’s doctrine and give force to the manner and form thesis advocated by Jennings 
and Heuston. But this evolution, we suggest, cannot adequately be explained by the implausible 
argument that the constitution rests on the bedrock of common law, that the judiciary is the 
authoritative interpreter of constitutional meaning, and that constitutional arrangements are now to 
be conceived not as an expression of power but as a complex of moral principles. The better view is 
that this attrition is an expression of changing political conditions within the British state, that these 
changes are most coherently explained through an examination of changing assumptions about the 
source and location of political authority, and that these changing assumptions are most clearly 
expressed through a relational understanding of sovereignty. That is, as power-generational conditions 
change they inevitably alter the power-distributive dimension of authority. Continuing institutional 
differentiation of governmental responsibilities now indicates that Parliament can no longer claim to 
be the sole repository of sovereign authority and this development is one in which Parliament itself 
has acquiesced. Manner and form limitations on Parliament’s authority are the product of political 
developments, developments in which central governmental institutions – not least Parliament itself 
– have played a decisive role.108 
                                                          
106 See R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56, esp. per Lord Steyn: ‘Parliament acting as ordinarily 
constituted may functionally redistribute legislative power in different ways. For example, Parliament could for 
specific purposes provide for a two-thirds majority in the House of Commons and the House of Lords. This would 
involve a redefinition of Parliament for a specific purpose. Such redefinition could not be disregarded.’ (at [81]). 
This should be read in the context of Lord Steyn’s broader point: ‘The classic account given by Dicey of the 
doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the 
modern United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution. 
The judges created this principle. If that is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the courts 
may have to qualify a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism.’ (at [102]). See further 
para.[163] per Baroness Hale. These obiter remarks are still somewhat heretical. For the opposite view of manner 
and form restrictions see Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] 3 WLR 247, per Laws LJ para 59: ‘Parliament 
cannot bind its successors by stipulating against repeal, wholly or partly, of the ECA. It cannot stipulate as to the 
manner and form of any subsequent legislation.’ This follows the orthodox view as expressed in Ellen Street Estates v 
Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590. For a forceful restatement of this position see M Elliott, ‘A “Permanent” Scottish 
Parliament and the Sovereignty of the UK Parliament: Four Perspectives’, UK Const. L. Blog, 28 Nov 2014: available 
at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ 
107 See, eg, T.R.S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 135-6, arguing that the 
manner and form thesis is a product of a legal positivist theory of law and avoids the need for judgment, judgment 
that depends on ‘the moral values that underpin our constitutional arrangements’ (at 136). Per contra, Michael 
Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2015), esp. ch.7. 
108 Gordon, ibid., defends the manner and form account in a series of sound arguments but then gives it a normative 
reading – an account of the significance of democracy in the British system. Our argument is that there is no need to 
adopt a normative theory: the modifications are the consequence of the evolving set of political power relations. The 
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The argument that Parliament has knowingly disclaimed much of the political dimension of 
sovereignty by effectively constraining its own legal authority is sustained by a series of older 
(Dominion/Commonwealth independence) and more recent developments extending from the 
United Kingdom’s accession to, and membership of, the European Union (the likelihood that new 
constraints will derive from the process of withdrawal from the EU is also discussed below), the 
development of a ‘territorial constitution’, the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 in a form 
that imposes structural conditions to ensure that domestic legislation complies with European 
Convention principles, and the manner in which legislation like the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
bolsters the independence of a judicial branch and legitimates its role in upholding ‘the existing 
constitutional principle of the rule of law’.109 Most of these developments have been widely discussed 
and it is not necessary to consider the implications of all of them in detail here. Our purpose is only 
to highlight certain crucial aspects of the institutional changes they have effected in ways that hollow 
out the claims of the Diceyan doctrine. 
UK membership of the European Union, for example, has undermined Dicey’s main 
tenets that the Crown-in-Parliament has ‘the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever’ and ‘that 
no person or body is recognised ... as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament’.110 Even at the date of accession on 1 January 1973 it was clear that the founding 
European treaties were a source not only of valid but also of superior law for Member States, 
which even express provisions within their domestic constitutions could not withstand.111 The 
European Communities Act 1972 made the ‘new legal order’ of the EU part of domestic law and, 
stating that all rights and obligations ‘from time to time arising by or under the Treaties … are 
without further enactment to be given legal effect’,112 accepted that the effect of this legal order 
would, if the Treaties so ordained, be direct and unmediated by Parliament. The 1972 Act also 
conceded to the European Court of Justice the entitlement in effect to override, and in so doing 
require domestic courts to set aside, the legislation of Parliament.113 That the 1972 Act qualified the 
                                                          
Scotland Act 2016 s.1 is a case in point. It inserts a new s.63A into the Scotland Act 1998, which declares that that 
‘the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional 
arrangements’ and are ‘not to be abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a 
referendum.’ The power relations which now characterise devolution make the unilateral abolition of Scottish 
devolved institutions by Act of Parliament without such a referendum so inconceivable as to render the formal legal 
power to do so nugatory. A conception of sovereignty which asserts the valence of an unusable power is, in 
constitutional terms, as Dicey himself eventually recognized, meaningless. 
109 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.1. 
110 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, above n 1, 27. 
111 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.  
112 European Communities Act 1972, s.2(1). 
113 Prior to accession, the ECJ had already enunciated two fundamental principles, those of the supremacy of 
European law and that of direct effect (which s.2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act affirmed). In Costa v ENEL, above 
n.111, the ECJ had declared that membership ‘carries with it a permanent limitation of [a state’s] sovereign rights’ in 
that a provision of Community law must prevail against any conflicting provision of domestic law and, further, that 
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Diceyan doctrine114 was in fact recognised by parliamentarians at the time of its passage,115 a 
political self-consciousness that would in due course be given legal recognition by the judiciary.116  
Such was the pervasive influence of EU primacy upon Parliament, a primacy willingly 
absorbed within the British system of government, that any assertion of the residual constituent 
power of the British people was, in this context at least, merely of rhetorical effect. It might be 
argued that this process is now set to be reversed and that  the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will 
reinstate unequivocally the supremacy of Parliament in relation to EU law. The European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 (‘the Withdrawal Act’) repeals the European Communities Act and if it 
effects a clean break with EU law then a strengthening of Parliament’s competence in relation to 
the EU follows. But such an outcome bolsters rather than undermines our essential contention 
that the legal dimension of supremacy is contingent upon politics: Parliament’s power varies 
depending upon the nature of the UK’s political relationship with the EU legal order. Furthermore, 
there are good reasons to question whether the process will in fact be as simple as suggested. The 
Withdrawal Act provides that law deriving from the EU -  ‘retained EU law’ (ss. 2-4) - will be given 
domestic effect after Brexit and will in fact benefit from the principle of ‘supremacy’ over pre-exit 
UK law (s. 5). That this body of law will authorize the disapplication of legislation enacted prior 
to exit day sits oddly with the traditional doctrine of implied repeal. Furthermore, a transitional 
period will apply until December 2021 in which the primacy of EU law seems certain to be 
maintained within UK law, and while the terms of any new relationship agreement are still to be 
negotiated with the EU, it is possible that the regulatory frameworks attached to a new relationship 
agreement will require UK acceptance of, and judicial submission to, the authority of EU 
jurisdiction in areas subject to such agreement, leading to a more restricted and contingent 
reassertion of ‘sovereignty’ than many imagine.  
                                                          
the rights and obligations created by Community law not only bind states as a matter of international law but are 
able also to be directly enforced by individuals in domestic courts. The ECJ would be the ultimate arbiter of the 
effect and enforcement of the supremacy of Community law (as recognised in the 1972 Act, s.3(1)). 
114 Sir William Wade, ‘Sovereignty - Revolution or Evolution?’ (1996) 112 LQR 568, at 571. Barber writes: ‘it is clear’ 
that parliamentary sovereignty ‘ceased to be a feature of the British constitution after Factortame; nonetheless, its 
emotional pull is such that many constitutional scholars write as if it continues to exist.’ N.W. Barber, ‘The afterlife 
of parliamentary sovereignty’, (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 144–154, 152. See also Barber, The 
Constitutional State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 112–116. 
115 Danny Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialization of British Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 89-
102. 
116 When the House of Lords later declined to enforce the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 after the ECJ had ruled that 
its provisions were contrary to obligations in the Treaty of Rome 1957, authoritative effect was given to this 
principle of primacy. As Lord Bridge stated in that case: ‘Whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted 
when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary’. Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, 
658. As the United Kingdom prepares to withdraw from the European Union, the capacity of the courts to disapply 
primary legislation has recently, and rather ironically, been restated: Benkharbouche v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2017] UKSC 62, causing Alison Young to describe disapplication as now ‘run of the mill’: A. 
Young, ‘Benkharbouche and the Future of Disapplication’, UK Const. L. Blog, 24 Oct. 2017: available at 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/.  
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If EU membership has demonstrated how the role of the Commons as the repository of 
sovereign authority can be diminished by the UK’s acceptance of an external source of authority, 
so too has the re-birth of sub-state nationalism. The status of the northern six counties of Ireland, 
which had been left unresolved in the 1920s, and demands for devolution in Scotland and Wales, 
have together become a major governmental preoccupation over the past half century. 
Membership of the EU initially enabled these developments to be contained and their 
constitutional significance diluted. The fact, for example, that both the Republic of Ireland and 
the United Kingdom as Member States had relinquished significant aspects of their sovereign 
powers to the EU helped resolve the Northern Ireland conflict, with EU law providing a crucial 
backdrop to the provisions of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement117 and the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998 through which it was endorsed.118 It was also uncontroversial that the competence of the 
new devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales should be circumscribed by 
the supremacy of EU law.119 Consequently, the EU has, in the words of a recent parliamentary 
committee report, become ‘in effect, part of the glue holding the United Kingdom together since 
1997’.120 This is because the supremacy of EU law has ‘in many areas ensured consistency of legal 
and regulatory standards across the UK, including in devolved policy areas’, with the result that 
‘the UK internal market has been upheld by the rules of the EU internal market’.121 
 Nevertheless, it was evident that even EU membership could not forever suppress the 
constituent dimension of sovereignty in the British constitution. The clearest signal of this was 
provided by the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. The election of an SNP Government 
in Edinburgh in 2011 with an overall majority and a mandate for such a referendum generated 
nothing short of a crisis of state. That the UK Government did not respond by asserting state 
sovereignty is indicative of changing political conditions and in particular the diminished authority 
of the Westminster Parliament. Implicitly recognizing that might creates right, in the Edinburgh 
Agreement of 2012 the Government conceded power to the Scottish Parliament to hold such a 
referendum and undertook to respect the result. The referendum might not have been won by the 
secessionist cause,122 but the issue remains far from being resolved.123 
                                                          
117 Belfast Agreement, Preamble: ‘The British and Irish Governments: … Wishing to develop still further the unique 
relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as 
partners in the European Union …’ The Belfast Agreement, Northern Ireland Office, 10 April 1998. 
118 Northern Ireland Act 1998 s.7. 
119 Scotland Act 1998, s.29(2)(d),  Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.6 and Government of Wales Act 1998 s.106 
(substantially amended by the Government of Wales Act 2006 s.108A). 
120 European Union Committee, Brexit: Devolution (4th Report of Session 2017–19, HL Paper 9), para 26. 
121 Ibid. 
122 To the proposition ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ 44.7 per cent voted Yes and 55.3 per cent No. 
123 On 13 March 2017 the First Minster of Scotland announced the intention to hold a second referendum on 
independence. These plans are currently on hold following the general election of 2017 but remain SNP party 
policy. 
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Meanwhile, English nationalism was also beginning to stir, in part fuelled by resentment 
over ostensibly special concessions over devolution but mainly because of an apparent desire for 
a more assertive relationship with the EU.124 One manifestation of the latter was the European 
Union Act 2011 by virtue of which Parliament sought to reassert its own legal supremacy by 
confirming that the direct applicability or direct effect of EU law was contingent upon the 
recognition of this status by the 1972 Act.125 It remained unclear whether this Act would have any 
impact on the legal relationship between UK and EU law or whether its effect would be purely 
symbolic.126 In particular, the Act introduced a ‘referendum-lock’ in relation to future EU treaty 
undertakings.127 Whether the judiciary would have accepted a ratification process wherein 
Parliament sought to bypass these provisions was never tested. The more important point is that, 
by requiring any further transfers of competences to the EU not only to be approved by Parliament 
but also to be affirmed in a referendum of the British people, the Act sought to shift the issue of 
supremacy from Parliament to ‘the people’. The 2011 Act, the product of a Government lacking 
significant representation in Scotland,128 signifies the strengthening of English national identity in 
part stimulated by dissatisfaction with constitutional developments. But most importantly, in 
seeking to bind the competence of future parliaments through the ‘referendum-lock’ and by 
transferring the final say from Parliament to the people, the Act was a self-conscious abdication 
of Parliament’s own supposedly ultimate legal sovereignty to popular political sovereignty.  
The 2011 Act is now redundant in face of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and has 
consequently been repealed by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.129 But this does not 
denote the rejuvenation of legal sovereignty: the Withdrawal Act is itself the consequence of the 
June 2016 referendum and is therefore yet another instance of Parliament’s transference of the 
fundamental decision on EU membership to the people. The 2018 Act also reflects the changing 
internal territorial realities of the UK. A provision which initially sought to place all of the powers 
returning from Brussels in the first instance with Whitehall - whether these fell within reserved or 
devolved areas - later to be dispersed to the devolved territories at the UK Government’s exclusive 
discretion, was seen to be so inconsistent with the spirit of devolution, most recently restated in 
                                                          
124 Charlie Jeffery et al., ‘Taking England Seriously: The New English Politics’, The Future 
of England Survey (2014) http:// www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/ sites/ default/ files/ news/ 
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126 See Martin Loughlin and Cal Viney, ‘The Coalition and the Constitution’ in Anthony Seldon and Mike Finn (eds) 
The Coalition Effect, 2010-15 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 59-86 at 75-77. 
127 European Union Act 2011, ss. 2-3. 
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129 Schedule 9. 
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the Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 2017, as to force a complete reversal of that approach.130 In 
the same vein, the anticipated Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill,131 intended to give 
effect to the exit agreement between the UK and EU, is likely to create a constitutional status sui 
generis for Northern Ireland so as to reflect the terms of the ‘joint report’ issued by the UK and EU 
on 8 December 2017.132 These developments show how fundamental political changes in the 
territorial constitution are conditioning the way in which the UK leaves the EU. 
Echoing Dicey’s response to the Home Rule crisis, the 2011 Act, the 2018 Act and the 
likely terms of the Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill each recognise that 
constitutional authority rests ultimately on popular legitimacy. Parliament’s acknowledgement that, 
on certain critical constitutional matters, its legal competence is dependent on popular 
endorsement recognizes as clearly as did Dicey’s utterances on Ireland a century earlier the inability 
of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty to contain the political, power-generational, 
dimension of sovereignty; this reality is emphasised by the Brexit referendum in 2016, the resulting 
decision to overturn the UK’s legal relationship with the EU on the basis of a popular vote and by 
the impact of devolution upon this process.  
Another example is ‘the Vow’ issued by all the main UK political parties following the 
Scottish independence referendum in 2014, promising that Scottish devolution would be 
‘permanent’, a commitment subsequently given formal effect in the Scotland Act 2016, as 
discussed above. As with the ‘referendum-lock’ provision in the European Union Act 2011, this 
commitment was reinforced by a similar protection in the new Scotland Act and most recently in 
the Wales Act 2017.133 Such provisions extinguish the formal rule that Parliament has the 
competence to make any law. This is more than a mere manner and form restriction. It is an 
undertaking by Parliament to be bound by the popular will of different parts of the United 
Kingdom. In doing so Parliament has recognised devolution as a political fact that cannot be ended 
unilaterally by parliamentary fiat.  
The result of the 2016 referendum highlights the importance of the relational concept of 
sovereignty, and, in particular, of the vital significance of its power-generational aspect. The most 
important constitutional decision of the past fifty years was made not by the purportedly sovereign 
Parliament but by the people directly. In the 2011 Act Parliament had asserted its supremacy over 
EU law in a practically meaningless manner. The reality of EU legal supremacy was a fact of 
                                                          
130 Cf. European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, cl.11 and European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 s.12. 
131 “New Bill to implement Withdrawal Agreement”, UK Government Press Release, 13 November 2017. 
132 ‘Joint Report from the Negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on Progress 
During Phase 1 of Negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s Orderly Withdrawal from the 
European Union’, TF50 (2017) 19 – Commission to EU 27, 8 December 2017. 
133 Scotland Act 2016, s.1. An equivalent provision is contained in the Wales Act 2017, s.1.  
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membership regardless of however much Parliament might gripe about it.134 That supremacy will 
now be ended and while technically it will be ended by Act of Parliament,135 the real decision was 
political not legal, made not by Parliament but by the people. That decision bolsters the claim that 
EU membership was first and foremost a restriction upon the power-generational dimension of 
sovereignty. In 1972 J.D.B. Mitchell and others maintained that the essential constitutional change 
had taken place on accession when the Government signed the Treaty and the 1972 Act merely 
provided a legal form to a more fundamental constitutional decision.136 It was therefore not 
surprising that the decision to leave the EU required a highly symbolic political endorsement 
through the express mobilization of constituent power. The UK’s withdrawal will be effected by 
way of the exit agreement;137 the European Union (Withdrawal) Act by which the ECA 1972 is 
repealed138 and the proposed Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill which implements 
the deal will merely facilitate and ratify respectively the exit agreement itself. This is not to 
undervalue the significance of law but merely to highlight the flexibility of legal ‘supremacy’ in the 
face of political realities. A further twist is to be found in the Withdrawal Agreement and 
Implementation Bill which, as discussed, is intended to give effect to the withdrawal deal signed 
by the UK and EU in December 2017; in this, the UK will undertake that citizens’ rights ‘will have 
effect in primary legislation and will prevail over inconsistent or incompatible legislation, unless 
Parliament expressly repeals this Act in future’.139 This explicit renunciation of the doctrine of 
implied repeal in relation to this Bill goes further even than the European Communities Act 1972 
in expressly curtailing a traditional feature of the  doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
undertaking that Parliament will restrict its own future legislative action.140 
The reawakening of the power-generational dimension of sovereignty in both the Scottish 
independence referendum and the Brexit referendum demonstrates the manifest limitations of the 
Diceyan account of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. But it also exposes certain deep 
fissures within the edifice of the British state, leading to the political dimension of sovereignty now 
playing out in troubling ways. Following the 2014 Scottish referendum, it came as no surprise that 
the Brexit referendum result was immediately analysed along ‘national’ lines, with majorities for 
leave in England and Wales being disaggregated from those for remain in Scotland and Northern 
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Ireland. Before the 2016 referendum the Scottish Government had called for a form of 
consociational referendum, whereby a majority vote in each of the four territories of the UK would 
be needed to provide consent to withdrawal from the EU.141 From the perspective of the formal 
doctrine of sovereignty such assertions can be dismissed as mere political claims; a simple majority 
across the UK was all that the European Union Referendum Act 2015 Act required. But this 
ignores the political fact that Parliament is no longer able ‘to maintain its status as the voice of the 
political nation assembled’. The language of nation within the UK is now the language of nations, 
a fact borne out by the manner in which the Brexit process has been conditioned by the territorial 
constitution.  
 
VI Conclusion 
 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Dicey had come to realise - largely because of his own 
political beliefs - that the legal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty he had earlier formulated with 
such great success presented a rather skewed and partial account of the concept. But in the end 
neither he nor any other influential constitutional law scholar of the early twentieth century was 
able to project a richer conception of sovereignty with which to offer a more nuanced account of 
British constitutional development. We continue to live with that legacy, which is most clearly 
manifest in our inability to devise an adequate conceptual framework through which to address 
the major constitutional questions of our time.  
Withdrawal from the European Union, the effective entrenchment of the territorial 
constitution and the growing influence of a rights discourse all resonate at the constitutional level. 
And in seeking to explain and account for continuing constitutional development it is now apparent 
that a conception of sovereignty which is equated to the unlimited legislative authority of the Crown-
in-Parliament and which rests on an inchoate appeal to the need for Westminster to hold on to 
untrammelled power is inadequate and must be jettisoned. Recent legislation such as the European 
Union Act 2011, the Scotland Act 2016 and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (especially 
its provisions relating to devolution) have shown that whenever the conditions of the power-
generative aspect of sovereignty change, the nature and status of the received legal doctrine is 
modified. The self-managed erosion of Parliament’s purported omni-competence in the Scotland Act 
2016 and Wales Act 2017 highlights the degree to which the absolutist legal doctrine has been qualified 
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by political developments. Reworking the meaning and significance of sovereignty is today the vital 
first step towards achieving conceptual renewal of the British constitution.  
Having demonstrated this by bringing Dicey’s political convictions into alignment with his 
legal doctrine, some legal positivist jurists might argue that his controversial political claims can be 
rejected without the authority of the doctrine being undermined. This is implausible. Dicey may 
have deployed the political underpinnings of sovereignty in a strategic way because of his personal 
views on Irish home rule but the essential nature of the legal-political nexus remains. Whatever his 
motivations, we draw from Dicey the cogent conclusion that the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty is a legal fact because it is a political fact. Indeed, can the legal fact be retained without 
the existence of the political fact? In one sense, this is precisely our argument about the source of 
current constitutional difficulties. But Dicey’s most distinguished twentieth century disciple, Sir 
William Wade, readily accepted that the doctrine exists as ‘the ultimate political fact’,142 a point that 
legal philosophers who rely on an ultimate ‘rule of recognition’ based on acceptance by officials 
cannot avoid conceding.143 And yet this type of separability claim does not go to the fundamentals 
of our analysis. 
 Our essential argument is that the shibboleth is not just to be found in the intrinsic 
connection between the legal and political aspects of Dicey’s views; it is the belief pervading 
modern British constitutional law that parliamentary sovereignty expresses certain qualities that a 
sovereign is deemed to possess. This tradition of thought, of which Dicey is only the most 
distinguished legal exponent, conceives the main tasks to be those of locating the sovereign (e.g., 
the Crown-in-Parliament) and then determining the sovereign’s essential attributes (e.g., unlimited 
legislative authority). This is a primitive view, the product of a history in which the concept of 
sovereignty had its originating source in the figure of the sovereign. But in the modern world of 
differentiated institutions of government, sovereignty is not the attribute of a single institution; it 
expresses the sum of relations formed through the manner in which political authority is 
constituted. In this understanding, institutional relations between legislative, executive and judicial 
authority evolve according to changing political conditions. If lawyers aspire to respond 
constructively to contemporary constitutional questions, then the shibboleth of that legal doctrine 
must be discarded and the modern concept of sovereignty embraced. 
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